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Abstract 
This thesis compares and contrasts two different systems for taxing US multinational 
corporations’ foreign-earned income to determine whether the US should adopt the alternative 
territorial tax approach.  This thesis begins with discussing the pros and cons of the current 
worldwide tax system in the US.  It then follows with the comparison of the alternative territorial 
approach.  Like the worldwide, the territorial system has important pros and cons the US needs 
to consider before deciding to switch from its current approach.  To help strengthen the argument 
towards adopting a territorial tax system, this thesis evaluates the tax systems of other relevant 
and comparable countries, focusing on Japan who transitioned from a worldwide to a territorial 
in 2009.  This thesis finishes with outlining specific policy actions that the US should implement 
when transitioning to a territorial system to not only ease the transition but also maximize the 
value of a territorial approach.  Therefore, this thesis concludes that the US should adopt a 
territorial tax system in place of its current worldwide approach due to the territorial’s superior 
tax policy and administration.  
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“In this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.”1  Although 
inevitable, taxes constitute an essential part of most personal, business, economic, and political 
decisions.  Taxes serve as a mean for governments to raise revenue to fund their various 
operations, which in turn protect the welfare of individuals, businesses, and the economy.  “Total 
tax revenues account for more than 80% of total government revenue in about half of the 
countries in the world and more than 50% in almost every country.”2  Focusing on the United 
States (US), the federal tax revenue derives from multiple tax sources, such as individual 
income, payroll, corporate income, goods, and estates.  In 2015, consistent with prior years, 
federal tax revenue consisted of 47% individual income taxes, 33% payroll taxes, 11% corporate 
income taxes, and 9% excise, estate, and other taxes.3  Specifically looking at corporate income 
taxes, one type of tax contained within the 11% is taxes on foreign-earned income.  The US 
manages its corporations’ foreign-earned income under a worldwide tax system.  However, many 
are debating whether the US should reform the current strict worldwide tax system or implement 
a new territorial system.  The two approaches differ primarily in their tax treatment of 
repatriating foreign-earned income back to the US.  One goal among tax policy creators remains 
unchanging; whichever system the US decides, the tax should be sufficient, convenient, efficient, 
and fair.  These four standards qualify as a good tax, and the US should strive to tax its citizens 
in this way.  Because its tax policy and administration on foreign-earned income qualify it as a 
good tax, the US should adopt a territorial tax system               
                                                          
1 “The meaning and origin of the expression: Nothing is certain but death and taxes,” The Phrase Finder, 
accessed May 4, 2017, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/death-and-taxes.html. 
2 Esteban Ortiz-Ospina and Max Roser, “Taxation,” Our World in Data, accessed May 4, 2017, 
https://ourworldindata.org/taxation/. 
3 “Policy Basics: Where Do Federal Tax Revenues Come From,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, last 
modified March 4, 2016, http://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-where-do-federal-tax-revenues-come-from. 
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The US currently practices a worldwide international corporate tax system.  Overall, a 
worldwide system taxes US multinational businesses headquartered in the US on repatriated 
dividends from their foreign subsidiaries’ income earned abroad.  In order to help explain 
further, dividing the present system into what, when, and at what rate the income is taxed, 
reveals both pros and cons to a worldwide approach.  First, the US Treasury Department taxes all 
income earned abroad, which, basically, treats the income as if the corporation had earned it 
domestically.  Second, with the exception of passive and portfolio income, which is taxable 
immediately, when the income is taxed depends on the organization of the multinational 
corporation’s foreign entity.  If the corporation, which must be headquartered in the US, 
organizes its entity as a branch, an unincorporated entity, the Treasury taxes income on an 
accrual basis.  Accrual basis recognizes income when earned and therefore, recognizes taxes due 
in the period earned.  On the other hand, if the corporation organizes its entity as a subsidiary, an 
incorporated entity, the corporation only owes taxes on their subsidiary’s active income when 
distributed as a dividend back to itself, the domestic parent.  This timing difference represents a 
deferral of income.  Third and last, as long as the US corporate, not state, tax rate exceeds the 
foreign tax rate, the taxes paid to the Internal Revenue Service comprise of the difference 
between the income earned taxed at the US corporate rate and the amount of taxes already paid 
to the foreign country at the foreign rate.  In situations when the foreign rate possess the higher 
percentage, corporations only pay their entity’s foreign taxes.  As these three components of the 
worldwide system suggest, the US expects its multinational businesses to pay, at a minimum, the 
amount of tax at US corporate rates on income earned abroad.       
Whether or not this expectation encourages or hinders businesses, the worldwide 
approach offers other pros and cons to US corporations.  As a great benefit, foreign subsidiaries 
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can defer paying taxes on their income earned abroad as long as they reinvest that income in 
normal and ordinary business activities, and unless they choose to take a deduction, 
multinational corporations can elect a foreign tax credit to avoid double taxation on their foreign 
entities’ income.  Deferring taxable income lowers the effective tax rate, or the total tax per 
dollar of total income, by incorporating the tax planning strategy of the time value of money.  In 
other words, because a dollar today is worth more than a dollar in the future, deferring a cash 
outflow decreases the present value of taxes paid.  Of course, this condition works best when tax 
rates are constant over time or at least when corporations can defer paying taxes to lower tax rate 
years.  In addition, the choice to defer depends on many factors, such as after-tax income, 
economic or business circumstances, opportunity costs, and nontax considerations.  The other 
benefit the US gives corporations under the worldwide system prevents double taxation on the 
same income.  As previously discussed under income tax rates, a foreign tax credit allows 
corporations to offset their US taxes payable on income earned abroad with their foreign tax 
liability only if the US has the greater corporate tax rate.  Moreover, the foreign tax credit 
provides the options for cross-crediting.  Cross-crediting permits “excess credits generated by 
one type of foreign income, [either active, passive, or portfolio] to flow over to other income in 
the same category and shield that income from any residual US tax.”4  Cross-crediting even 
applies to royalty payments from intangible assets and income from export sales.  Indeed, like 
deferrals and most tax credits, corporations who claim the foreign credit face limitations that 
                                                          
4 Rosanne Altshuler, Stephen Shay, and Eric Toder, “Lessons the United States Can Learn from Other 
Countries’ Territorial Systems for Taxing Income of Multinational Corporations,” Tax Policy Center, last modified 
January 21, 2015, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/lessons-united-states-can-learn-other-countries-
territorial-systems-taxing-income/full. 
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they need to consider before making business decisions.  Subject to each income class, the 
foreign tax credit limit  
Defines whether income is treated as domestic or foreign and the extent to which 
overhead expenses (interest, R&D expenditures, general and administrative expenses) of 
the home corporation that support both domestic and foreign investment are deductible 
against domestic income.5   
All in all, the income deferral and foreign credit aspects of the worldwide system in the US 
intend to alleviate the tax burden of multinational corporations.   
However, in spite of its intentions and advantages, the worldwide system also poses risks 
to multinational corporations and the US as a whole.  Although it strengthens the use of a 
worldwide approach, deferring income also serves as the major disadvantage to a worldwide 
system.  More specifically, corporations can defer their subsidiaries’ foreign income indefinitely.  
Even though corporations could profit from this timing strategy, problems arise from the 
motives, opportunities, and results of an indefinite deferral of income.  First, many motives 
surround a corporation’s decision to defer income.  Each corporation may have reasons pertinent 
to its unique position, but the high corporate tax rate in the US motivates the majority.  
Compared to the rest of the world, the US has the third largest top marginal corporate tax rate at 
38.92%, consisting of the 35% federal and 3.92% average state tax rates.6  Out of 188 countries 
with a worldwide average of 22.5% and a worldwide GDP-weighted average of 29.5%, the US 
trails behind the United Arab Emirate’ 55% and Puerto Rico’s 39%.7  Of course, the fluctuating, 
tiered-bracket structure of the US corporate income tax rates does not subject every corporation 
                                                          
5 Ibid. 
6 Kyle Pomerleau and Emily Potosky, “Corporate Income Tax Rates around the World, 2016,” Tax 
Foundation, last modified August 18, 2016, https://taxfoundation.org/corporate-income-tax-rates-around-world-
2016/. 
7 Ibid. 
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to the almost 39% marginal rate, but considering the size of most multinational corporations, 
their taxable income would still tax them at a minimum rate of 34%.  Nevertheless, because a 
higher tax rate means more taxes paid and less after-tax income retained, corporations want to 
defer repatriating their income back to the US for as long as possible, especially when they can 
use the allocated tax money for more important business resources.   
Next, looking at the opportunities available, corporations have both international and 
domestic incentives to defer taxable income.  As mentioned earlier, as long as they reinvest their 
subsidiaries’ income earned abroad in ongoing business activities, corporations can defer their 
taxable income.  Since the US ranked third in the highest corporate tax rate, corporations have 
several other countries as viable options to pair paying international taxes at a low rate with 
deferring US taxes as a high rate.  Even if “countries that have no corporate income tax or a very 
low corporate tax – such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and the Bahamas – provide very little 
real business [reinvestment] opportunities for American corporations,” US financial accounting 
and reporting standards further incentivize deferring income.8  Under Accounting Standards 
Codification (ASC) 740, corporations do not have to report the otherwise required accrued tax 
liability or income tax expense on their financial statements if they meet certain criteria that 
designate their deferred income as Permanently Reinvested Earnings (PRE).  Furthermore, these 
inadequate reporting standards allows public “companies to avoid disclosing [the US tax they 
would pay upon repatriation of their offshore profits] by asserting that calculating this tax 
liability is ‘not practicable.’”9       
                                                          
8 “Fortune 500 Companies Hold a Record $2.4 Trillion Offshore,” Citizens for Tax Justice, last modified 
March 4, 2016, 
http://ctj.org/ctjreports/2016/03/fortune_500_companies_hold_a_record_24_trillion_offshore.php#.WQvV0Ma1
uM9. 
9 Ibid. 
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The combination of wanting to mitigate high corporate tax rates with being able to take 
advantage of other countries’ lower rates and the tax and financial reporting incentives in the US 
creates substantial results for multinational corporations and the entire US.  Even though 
corporate income taxes and therefore, taxes on foreign-earned income account for very little of 
the federal tax revenue in the US, the worldwide approach greatly reduces the likelihood of the 
US increasing the current collection of the subsequent taxes because of its reinforcement over 
corporations’ decisions to defer income.  Although alternative methods to compensate for this 
lost tax revenue may exist, foreign-earned income staying abroad also discourages domestic 
investment and overall competition.  In fact, analysts estimate that US multinational corporations 
possess over $2.5 trillion in “unremitted foreign earnings, a substantial portion of which is in 
cash … that cannot be reinvested in the US business or given to shareholders.”10  These trapped 
earnings become not only a lost tax revenue but also a potential lost domestic investment in 
tangible and intangible assets such as equipment, jobs, and wages because corporations must 
invest these PRE into their foreign subsidiaries.  Moreover, these PRE yield the most efficient 
yet ineffective way for corporations to compete with their foreign competitors.  To explain its 
monetary efficiency, under a worldwide system, deferring income indefinitely minimizes taxes 
paid while maximizing after-tax income that corporations can allocate towards increasing and 
strengthening their competitive advantage.  However, this efficiency does not correlate with 
effective market location and control.  In other words,  
Merged entities are less likely to locate their parent company in a country with a 
worldwide tax regime and that the US international tax system leads to US companies 
being less competitive when trying to acquire other companies.11   
                                                          
10 Michelle Hanlon, “Testimony of Michelle Hanlon and Howard W. Johnson, Professor, MIT Sloan School 
of Management, before the United States House Committee on Ways and Means,” House Ways and Means, last 
modified February 24, 2016, https://waysandmeans.house.gov/UploadedFiles/HanlonTestimony78FC.pdf.  
11 Ibid. 
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Ignoring other factors, a corporation’s choice not to locate its headquarters in a country 
practicing worldwide tactics saves it from paying or deferring the extra tax on its repatriated 
foreign income.  Of course, the worldwide approach only pertains to US multinational 
corporations headquartered in the US.  Thus, the US implemented strong anti-inversion policies 
to deter these corporations moving their headquarters to a different country, “but little prevents 
US businesses from selling themselves to foreign-owned businesses,” especially when matched 
with less competitive acquisitions.12  As a matter of fact,  
US companies with large amounts of cash held in their foreign subsidiaries are more 
likely to purchase foreign companies than domestic companies, and these acquisitions of 
foreign companies are less value enhancing than other acquisitions.13  
To summarize, a worldwide system may not be the only and direct cause of lost tax revenue, 
domestic investment, and market competition for the US, but it significantly influences these 
results with its motivating high corporate tax rates and domestic and foreign opportunities.  
These disadvantages have led others to question whether the US should adopt a territorial tax 
system. 
Unlike worldwide, a pure territorial system taxes income where earned, regardless of the 
location of a business’ headquarters or the organization of its foreign entities as subsidiaries or 
branches.  The majority of countries classified as territorial do not follow a pure territorial 
approach though.  Instead, they enact an exemption system that exempts most or all foreign-
earned income from domestic taxation.  Thus, under an exemption system, a corporation would 
reduce its domestic tax base by its foreign branch’s accrual-based income and/or its foreign 
                                                          
12 Curtis S. Dubay, “A Territorial Tax System Would Create Jobs and Raise Wages for U.S. Workers,” The 
Heritage Foundation, last modified September 12, 2013, http://www.heritage.org/taxes/report/territorial-tax-
system-would-create-jobs-and-raise-wages-us-workers#_ftn17. 
13 Michelle Hanlon, “Testimony of Michelle Hanlon and Howard W. Johnson, Professor, MIT Sloan School 
of Management, before the United States House Committee on Ways and Means.” 
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subsidiary’s repatriated dividends.  Generally, countries permit businesses to exempt 95% of 
their foreign earnings.14  The purpose of taxing the remaining percentage protects a country’s 
domestic corporate tax base.  Using a similar ideology, countries usually do not grant foreign tax 
credits, and since they exempt most repatriated dividends, corporations usually have no need to 
defer and permanently reinvest their subsidiary’s foreign-earned income.  Even though a greater 
number of territorial countries deviate from pure territoriality in the form of an exemption 
system, additional modifications to the pure approach include inclusion of income categories, 
deductibility of foreign-generated expenses, changes to corporate tax rates, and preferential 
treatment of intellectual property.15  Ultimately, each country adapts its territorial system to 
address its own specific needs, but popular trends emerge among these modifications.  First, the 
tax base typically excludes or exempts active income while including or taxing narrowly defined 
passive and portfolio income.  Furthermore, the tax base deducts expenses, like legitimate 
interest, incurred in creating foreign revenues.  Next, because the tax base and tax rate calculate 
the tax revenue or liability, increasing or decreasing the tax rate increases or decreases, 
respectively and all else equal, the tax.  Hence, countries tend to lower their corporate tax rates 
when transitioning to a territorial system.  Likewise, countries frequently tax their income 
attributable to intellectual property at lower, preferential rates.  Above all, these modifications 
along with the exemption system differ among countries but collectively show the flexibility of a 
territorial system.  They also convey why every other Group of 7 (G7) country and 28 of the 33 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries tax under a 
territorial system to enable multinational corporations to repatriate their active foreign earnings 
                                                          
14 Curtis S. Dubay, “A Territorial Tax System Would Create Jobs and Raise Wages for U.S. Workers.” 
15 Philip Dittmer, “A Global Perspective on Territorial Taxation,” Tax Foundation, last modified August 10, 
2012, https://taxfoundation.org/global-perspective-territorial-taxation/. 
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with minimal domestic tax.  Obviously, no matter the prevalence, “others’ experiences do not 
necessarily dictate that the United States should follow the same path.”16  Accordingly, the US 
should carefully weigh the pros and cons of a territorial tax system before contemplating a 
switch from its current worldwide approach.  
Because of its sufficiency, convenience, efficiency, and fairness, a territorial system 
presents the US with a more superior way to enforce it tax policy and administration on foreign-
earned income.  The first standard of a good tax, sufficiency, deals with the ability of a tax to 
raise adequate revenue for government purposes.  Thus, a sufficient tax balances a government’s 
budget.  The over $19.8 trillion US budget deficit communicates not only excess federal 
spending but also insufficient tax collection, both of which lead the US to rely on other sources 
of funds like borrowing.17  The worldwide system is not solely responsible for this budget 
deficit, especially since foreign-earned income represents a small portion of the US federal tax 
revenue, but it has contributed to over $2.5 trillion trapped earnings abroad or lost tax revenue to 
the US.  On the other hand, a territorial approach removes the incentives for corporations to keep 
foreign-earned income oversees, especially when paired with lowering the US corporate tax rate.  
Certainly, a territorial system will not cause all corporations to invest their foreign earnings 
domestically and subject that income to US taxes, but it offers a more effective impact on 
reducing the amount of trapped earnings abroad and on converting them into US tax revenue.  
The second standard of a good tax evaluates the convenience for a government to administer it 
and the convenience for a taxpayer to pay it.  To be more specific, convenience minimizes the 
time and money spent in complying with relevant tax laws.  As the most expensive provision of 
                                                          
16 Rosanne Altshuler, Stephen Shay, and Eric Toder, “Lessons the United States Can Learn from Other 
Countries’ Territorial Systems for Taxing Income of Multinational Corporations.” 
17 US Debt Clock, accessed May 4, 2017, http://www.usdebtclock.org/. 
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the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), the US Corporation Income Tax Return “accounts for 36 
percent of the total cost of the entire tax code, at $147 billion,”18 with “a disproportionate share 
associated with the international requirements of the tax code.”19  Two of these international 
components include dividends and distributions and the foreign tax credit, which combined, 
consume over 59 billion total annual hours.20  Although the complexity and fluctuation of the 
IRC and other tax laws will continue to require the average taxpayer or tax-paying entity to hire 
a tax accountant or firm to complete his tax return, a territorial reform offers a simpler approach 
to decreasing compliance costs for both the government and taxpayers.  For instance, 
implementing a dividend exemption system along with removing the foreign tax credit would 
simplify the code, and corporations could divert the saved compliance costs to more productive 
uses.   
As the third standard of a good tax, efficiency describes either a tax that does not 
influence a taxpayer’s decisions or a tax that changes taxpayers’ reactions to a desired behavior.  
The worldwide system does not fit either definition.  First, the worldwide approach interferes 
with corporations’ economic decisions, including which country to place headquarters, which 
countries to locate subsidiaries, and whether to permanently reinvest their foreign earnings or 
repatriate them back to the US.  Moreover, regardless of the deferral option and foreign tax 
credit, which policymakers designed to relieve unnecessary tax burdens, a worldwide approach 
wants corporations to pay US federal income taxes on their foreign-earned income.  Instead, 
corporations utilize the shortcomings of the system to avoid paying US taxes through legal 
                                                          
18 Scott A. Hodge, “The Compliance Costs of IRS Regulations,” Tax Foundation, last modified June 15, 
2016, https://taxfoundation.org/compliance-costs-irs-regulations/. 
19 Philip Dittmer, “A Global Perspective on Territorial Taxation.”  
20 Scott A. Hodge, “The Compliance Costs of IRS Regulations.”  
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indefinite deferral of Permanently Reinvested Earnings.  On the other hand, a territorial system 
reinforces efficiency not only with its disincentives on business location and income deferral but 
also with its neutral tax policy and administration on both foreign and domestic investment.  
Because corporations should not have to base their decisions merely on taxes, a truly neutral tax 
system should not affect the pre-tax return on an investment.  Under the current worldwide 
approach, in order for a corporation to repatriate its income or dividends back to the US for 
investment purposes, “the expected return must be higher than the foreign return on investment 
plus the US tax on the repatriated money.”21  Naturally, this system “does not prevent all foreign 
[and domestic] investment, [but] the extra tax it applies stops the marginal investments that do 
not meet the higher rate of return.”22  In contrast, a territorial approach eliminates that extra US 
tax, giving those corporations, who originally fell short from the required return, a chance to 
make a new, feasible investment decision without the conflict of the extra tax, all else being 
equal.  Furthermore, a territorial system creates a stronger correlation between the relationship of 
foreign and domestic investment and between the relationship of foreign and domestic employee 
wages.  Statistically, a  
10 percent greater foreign investment is associated with a 2.6 percent greater domestic 
investment, and a 10 percent greater foreign employee compensation is associated with a 
3.7 percent greater domestic employee compensation.”23   
Many factors attribute to these percentages, but the underlying idea contradicts the popular 
opinion that investment abroad results in a lost investment opportunity domestically.  The 
percentages suggest that “the level of total production might not be fixed but, instead, responsive 
                                                          
21 John Barrasso, “Territorial vs. Worldwide Taxation,” Senate Republican Policy Committee, last modified 
September 19, 2012, https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/territorial-vs-worldwide-taxation. 
22 Curtis S. Dubay, “A Territorial Tax System Would Create Jobs and Raise Wages for U.S. Workers.” 
23 Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines Jr., “Domestic Effects of the Foreign Activities of U.S. 
Multinationals,” University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, last modified 2009, 
http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2452&context=articles. 
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to profit opportunities that are influenced by economic growth rates;” therefore, foreign 
investment may increase “the return to domestic production, stimulating domestic factor demand 
and domestic output.”24  For example, foreign branches or subsidiaries may be able to produce 
products at a lower cost than their domestic counterparts may, but they can also be a viable buyer 
of tangible and intangible assets produced in the US.  Because many corporations follow a 
common trend of transferring or outsourcing their lower value-added work to their foreign 
affiliates, their domestic capacities tend to have higher-skilled jobs and products, especially in 
areas of management positions, research and development, and intellectual property.  These 
higher-skilled jobs and products may have higher costs, but they also have higher sales prices 
and employee compensation.  Overall, the territorial system taxes corporations more efficiently; 
it does not conflict with corporations’ investment decisions on where to achieve the highest 
return, which allows not only growth abroad but growth at home in terms of a better flow of 
capital, higher employee compensation, and higher quality employment opportunities.   
The last criteria of a good tax evaluates fairness based on horizontal and vertical equity.  
Both equities revolve around a taxpayer’s ability to pay taxes with the economic resources under 
his or her control.  Horizontal equity says those taxpayers “with the same ability to pay (as 
measured by the tax base) owe the same amount of tax,” while vertical equity says taxpayers 
“with a greater ability to pay owe more tax than persons with a lesser ability to pay.”25  Hence, 
horizontal equity relates to a tax base, while vertical equity relates to a tax rate.  Because the 
corporate income tax rate schedule ultimately determines the US federal income tax rate applied 
to corporations’ taxable income, a territorial system would not change the tax rates extensively, 
                                                          
24 Ibid. 
25 Shelley C. Rhoades-Catanach and Sally M. Jones, “Taxes Should Be Fair,” in Principles of Taxation for 
Business and Investment Planning: 2009 Edition, (New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2009), 32-33. 
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unless it included an additional provision to lower the current corporate rate.  The bigger concern 
for a territorial approach pertains to the tax base.  Because the territorial system does not subject 
foreign-earned income to domestic taxation, it shrinks a corporation’s domestic taxable income 
relative to the worldwide system.  In other words, corporations have a higher after-tax income, 
other things held constant, or more income saved from paying taxes that they can spend on other 
things like investing.  This higher after-tax income equates to domestic and international fairness 
not only in ability to pay but also in competition.  Corporations can better compete with their 
comparable domestic and foreign rivals because they do not have to pay the extra tax imposed 
under a worldwide system.  Corporations can use that saved income to enhance their competitive 
advantage.  Even if they decide not to allocate in that way, a territorial approach gives them 
greater flexibility to make that decision.  Furthermore, increasing the competition of US 
corporations helps to increase the competition of the US from a global standpoint.  For 
businesses and the economy, healthy competition aids in innovation, customer service, and many 
other benefits.  All in all, a territorial system’s sufficiency, convenience, efficiency, and fairness 
would be a practical and reasonable solution to the current worldwide problems of excessive 
foreign-trapped earnings and compliance costs.  More satisfactory, it would provide an 
advantageous opportunity for investment and competition throughout the world.      
Although a territorial system has many valuable aspects, it does pose some potential side 
effects that the US needs to take into consideration.  Because a territorial approach removes the 
incentives for corporations to permanently reinvest foreign-earned income oversees, corporations 
have the power to invest or spend their income how and where they want to.  One ramification of 
this freedom of choice “allows the shifting of profits to no or low-tax locations where the 
business has little or no economic activity; these activities are referred to as base erosion and 
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profit shifting (BEPS).”26  Of course, corporations are able to exploit these activities legally due 
to gaps and disparities in the tax code, but the seriousness of the consequences of BEPS are what 
have led to a global movement by the OECD countries to collectively work towards closing 
these gaps.  In order to address the BEPS issues adequately, countries must understand the 
components of BEPS.  Even though the acronym combines them together, base erosion and 
profit shifting constitute two different activities.  In fact, they share a causal relationship, in 
which the shifting of profits erodes the tax base.  As one of the causes of base erosion, profit 
shifting can take on many forms, but earnings stripping tends to be the most common.  Earnings 
stripping “artificially shifts earnings on paper to offshore tax havens – countries with very low or 
nonexistent taxes” – to minimize overall taxes paid.27  Two frequent methods used to accomplish 
this minimization objective include transfer pricing and thin capitalization.  First, under transfer 
pricing, corporations transfer intangible assets at the lowest price possible to their branches or 
subsidiaries located in lower-tax jurisdictions.  Because the transfer represents a transfer of 
ownership, the corporation must make royalty payments to the branch or subsidiary in exchange 
for the right to use the intangible asset in the future.  Under a territorial approach, the branch or 
subsidiary benefits from the corporation’s royalty payments, often paid at the highest price 
possible, because the payments equate to income only taxable at the affiliate’s lower rate.  The 
corporation could benefit from the transfer as well if it “is able to deduct the inflated royalty 
payments, thereby reducing the amount of its” taxable income subject to its higher rate. 28  
                                                          
26 “OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, 2015 Final Reports, Information Brief,” OECD, 
accessed May 4, 2017, https://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-reports-2015-information-brief.pdf. 
27 “Switching to a ‘Territorial’ Corporate Tax System Would Encourage Offshore Tax Dodging,” U.S. PIRG 
Education Fund, accessed May 4, 2017, 
http://www.frontiergroup.org/sites/default/files/U.S.%20PIRG%20Ed%20Fund%20territorial%20tax%20factsheet
%20(web).pdf. 
28 Joel Friedman, Chye-Ching Huang, and Chuck Marr, “The Fiscal and Economic Risks of Territorial 
Taxation,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, last modified January 31, 2013, 
http://www.cbpp.org/research/the-fiscal-and-economic-risks-of-territorial-taxation. 
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Corporations can transfer tangible assets also, but the difficulty in valuing intangible assets limits 
tax authorities’ ability to challenge a corporation’s intercompany transfer price.  Particularly, 
since corporations do not typically trade intangible assets in open markets, establishing a fair 
market value requires speculative judgments and estimates.  This difficulty in accounting for 
intangibles helps explain why the intangible-heavy pharmaceutical and technology industries 
favor transfer pricing business strategies for their intellectual property.  While corporations can 
manipulate transfer pricing under a worldwide and territorial system, a territorial system gives 
corporations a permanent legal avoidance of domestic taxes on foreign-earned income if they 
transfer their intangibles to their foreign entities.  The net effect of lower foreign and domestic 
taxes paid contradict the neutral policy of a territorial approach and could cause a base erosion 
for any domestic tax rate higher than the foreign affiliates’ rate.  The other technique of earnings 
stripping, thin capitalization, deals with intercompany interest and borrowing.  Thin 
capitalization occurs when a parent corporation leverages as much of the entire corporation’s 
debt, and the lighter-leveraged branches and subsidiaries in lower-tax jurisdictions make loans to 
the parent corporation.  The affiliates treat the interest payments received as income, while the 
parent corporation treats the interest payments on the debt borrowed as deductions.  Similar to 
transfer pricing, the income to the affiliates is taxed at the lower rate, whereas the deduction to 
the parent reduces the taxable base at the higher rate.  This pairing generates a tax savings to the 
corporation, but under a territorial system, the tax savings would be bigger because like transfer 
pricing, the affiliates, if foreign, would never pay domestic taxes on their earned income.  This 
encouragement to borrow within the company could erode the domestic taxable base if 
corporations choose to continue borrowing in this way.     
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In spite of the fact that transfer pricing and thin capitalization present risks to most 
territorial systems, especially to pure territorial ones, the US faces more stringent repercussions 
with its third largest corporate tax rate.  The high corporate tax rate further encourages US 
corporations to transfer their intangibles to and borrow from their lower-rate foreign entities, so 
they can use the subsequent deductions to lessen the amount of their income taxed at that high 
rate.  Even if corporations intend for this reasoning to be a valid business strategy, it could 
disadvantage other domestic corporations or the US as a whole.  In other words, because the 
corporations who shift assets and income oversees still  
Benefit from US markets, infrastructure, and workforce and security by paying next to 
nothing for these benefits, ordinary taxpayers end up picking up the tab through higher 
taxes, higher national debt, or budget cuts to public programs.29 
Other domestic corporations, especially smaller businesses, may then have a harder time 
competing since they would not receive the same tax benefits, such as the deductible royalty and 
interest payments.  Moreover, the high US corporate tax rate under a territorial system could 
motivate multinational corporations to locate their headquarters in lower tax rate countries to 
avoid altogether the high US rate.  Finally, history may not always repeat itself, but it can be a 
good indicator of future responses.  In 2004, Congress decided to test the shift to a territorial 
system by deeming a temporary tax repatriation holiday for US-based multinational corporations.  
The holiday gave corporations a chance to repatriate their foreign-earned income back to the US 
and only pay a 5.25 percent tax rate on the income.  Corporations reacted in the opposite that 
Congress had sought for initially.  They mostly “cut jobs in 2005-06 – despite overall economy-
wide job growth in those years – and many used the repatriated funds simply to repurchase stock 
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or pay dividends.”30  In fact, share repurchases accounted for 20 percent of all repatriated foreign 
earnings.31  The corporations who acted in this way reaped billions of dollars but did not 
represent the majority.  The holiday created an unequal distribution where “five firms got over 
one-quarter of the tax benefits of the repatriation holiday, and just 15 firms got more than 50 
percent of the benefits.”32  As the example of the tax repatriation holiday shows, the territorial 
tax system may not always produce favorable outcomes.  Its primary risk, profit-shifting 
techniques like transfer pricing and thin capitalization, can result in erosion of the taxable base.  
In terms of the US, the high corporate tax rate could increase the risks because as the third 
largest rate, corporations could shift resources or relocate to countries with lower rates.  If the US 
adopted a territorial approach, it will need to create and implement modifications to address the 
shortcomings unique to its situation, especially those issues that emerged from the tax 
repatriation holiday.  
A territorial system’s cons may hinder a country’s decision to convert to its methods of 
taxing foreign-earned income, but as the other G7 and the majority of the OECD countries 
demonstrate, more countries prefer its tax treatment.  Even so, most of these countries do not 
have pure territorial systems, and instead, they deviate from it by enacting various policy 
adjustments like the dividend exemption system.  Interestingly enough, many of these countries 
originally taxed under a worldwide system before adopting their current territorial system.  One 
such country, Japan, switched from a worldwide to a territorial approach in 2009.  Prior to 2009, 
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Japan’s worldwide system operated in much the same way as the current worldwide approach in 
the United States does.  
It taxed Japanese corporations’ foreign-source income upon repatriation while allowing 
tax credits for corporate income taxes paid by Japanese-owned subsidiaries in foreign 
jurisdictions and other related taxes paid to foreign governments, including withholding 
taxes on dividend, royalty, and interest payments between foreign subsidiaries and their 
Japanese parents.33 
However, leading up the switch in 2009, Japan began to question the consequences of its 
worldwide approach.  Similar to the US, Japan estimated that multinational corporations “held 
offshore approximately US $150 billion in foreign subsidiary earnings.”34  Paired with having 
complex tax codes and holding one of the highest corporate tax rates, much comparable to the 
US, Japan worried “that this pool of earnings represented foregone investment in Japan and that 
the barrier to repatriation increased the risk that R&D operations would be moved abroad.”35  
Japan’s overall competitiveness was a concern, especially with the internal social and the 
external economic environments.  Internally, Japan had an aging population and shrinking labor 
pool.  Externally, the impact of the 2007-2009 recession had provoked a global financial crisis 
and decreased investor confidence around the world.  Therefore, the three primary objectives 
why legislators proposed a territorial change consisted of  
Replacing the indirect foreign tax credit for simplicity; enabling Japanese enterprise to 
repatriate foreign profits as they wish; and stimulating the Japanese economy for capital 
investment, research and development, and employment.36   
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Today, Japan’s territorial system reflects these three primary objectives.  Preceded by reductions 
to its corporate tax rate, Japan transitioned to a 95-percent dividend exemption system with 
specific criteria regarding corporate stock ownership.  As long as Japanese parent corporations 
own at least 25 percent of their foreign subsidiary’s common or voting shares for at least six 
months as of the dividend declaration date, they can exempt 95-percent of their subsidiaries’ 
repatriated dividends from domestic taxation.  The existing five percent “of non-exempt 
dividends are regarded as expenses incurred by parent firms for earning foreign income and are 
added to the calculation of Japanese taxable income.”37  As a tradeoff for the dividend income 
exclusion, parent corporations cannot elect the indirect foreign tax credit against the five percent.  
Furthermore, the entire dividend exclusion does not apply to 10 percent Japanese shareholders of 
foreign subsidiaries, whose common or voting shares are at least 50 percent owned by Japanese 
residents and who pay an effective tax rate of less than 20 percent.  Altogether, Japan designed a 
territorial system to not only allow greater repatriation of foreign-earned income but also protect 
the corporate taxable base against erosion.    
Since its adoption in 2009, Japan’s territorial system has had a net positive effect on 
Japan’s economic measures, especially unemployment and corporate tax revenue.  In spite of an 
increase in 2009, Japan’s unemployment rate has been decreasing annually since 2010.  In fact, 
in February 2017, Japan’s unemployment fell to 2.8%, the lowest rate in 22 years.38  Naturally, 
the territorial system is not solely responsible for the decline, but interestingly enough, the 
decline has remained consistent even with the aftermath of the 2007-2009 global recession and 
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the 2011 earthquake and tsunami.  One explanation for the 2011 earthquake and tsunami could 
be that Japanese corporations repatriated foreign earnings back to Japan to help fund the 
recovery process.  Similar to the unemployment rate, corporate tax revenue decreased in 2009, 
but it has been increasing steadily since 2010, suggesting that the territorial system has not 
drastically eroded Japan’s corporate taxable base.  Even though Japan has experienced many 
advantages under the territorial approach, they have also seen some unexpected outcomes.  The 
biggest of which did not meet Japan’s initial expectations involved one of its primary objectives 
for transitioning to a territorial system.  Specifically, “while the number of foreign affiliates 
paying dividends did not increase as a result of the legislation, dividend exemption increased 
dividend repatriations from foreign affiliates that had paid dividends under the worldwide tax 
system.”39  The more profitable subsidiaries repatriated both the higher number and the higher 
amount of these total dividend payments.  However, as the consistency of the unemployment rate 
and corporate tax revenue suggests, these unexpected reactions have not negatively influenced 
the economy severely.  In sum, to evaluate Japan’s switch from a worldwide to a territorial 
approach fully, one must consider the unique aspects of Japan during those timeframes.  Overall, 
though, Japan exemplifies the flexibility of policy creation and the economic effectiveness of a 
system who taxes under a territorial approach.    
Japan’s situation may not replicate the transition of the US to a territorial tax system, but 
it offers some guidance on strategy implementation.  In other words, in order for the US to adopt 
a territorial approach, the US needs to consider adding policy changes to address US-specific as 
well as territorial risks.  In terms of US-specific risks, lowering the US corporate tax rate would 
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further enhance the competitiveness of the US.  As a common trend among territorial countries, 
lowering the corporate tax rate would help to remove the US as an outlier among developed 
countries and to make the US a more viable country to bring foreign profits to and invest in 
domestically and internationally.  Because decreasing the corporate tax rate may induce 
behaviors to exploit the inadequacies of a territorial approach, the US needs to actively search for 
these deficiencies.  Looking at the territorial risks, the US should focus on policies that protect 
against profit shifting and base erosion.  First, since transfer pricing and thin capitalization give 
incentives for corporations to shift profits into lower-tax jurisdictions, the US should address 
both.  A patent box policy taxes income from intangible property at a lower rate.  This 
preferential treatment would not only make keeping intangibles in the US as an attractive option 
but also encourage more innovative activities like research and development.  Likewise, the US 
could limit the deductibility of the interest expense paid from a parent to its foreign subsidiary to 
only legitimate borrowing costs.  One such way could deny, “US business interest deductions if 
[the parent’s] indebtedness exceeds that of all of its combined foreign subsidiaries or if its debt 
exceeds a certain portion of its income.”40  Having this appropriate limitation guards against 
abusive profit shifting and earnings stripping.  Next, to help prevent erosion of the corporate 
taxable base, the US could narrowly define passive income to exclude only legitimate ordinary 
and necessary business income.  Increasing the income activities included in passive income 
maintains a higher level of income subject to tax.  Lastly, implementing a 95 percent dividend 
exemption system would still permit foreign subsidiaries to repatriate 95 percent of their 
dividends back to the US, while only paying taxes on the remaining 5 percent to preserve the tax 
base more adequately.  In summary, these policy recommendations do not constitute an 
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exhaustive list, but they help the US utilize the strengths and weaknesses of a territorial system 
to its own advantage.   
To conclude, the worldwide and the territorial system both provide a means of taxing 
foreign-earned income.  Currently, the worldwide system in the US taxes multinational 
businesses headquartered in the US on both foreign earnings from their foreign branches and 
repatriated dividends from their foreign subsidiaries’ income earned abroad.  Although the 
current policy allows subsidiaries to defer repatriating those dividends as long as they 
permanently reinvest them abroad and allows most corporations to mitigate double taxation with 
the election of the tax credit, the worldwide approach has created some negative consequences to 
the US.  Corporations hold an estimated $2.5 trillion of income oversees that should otherwise be 
subject to US taxes, except the worldwide approach influences corporations to act oppositely, 
especially with a corporate tax rate that ranks third globally.  An alternative approach, the 
territorial system, taxes income where earned, regardless of the location of a corporation’s 
headquarters or the organization of the foreign entity as a branch or subsidiary.  The territorial 
system not only exempts the repatriated dividends taxed under a worldwide approach, but it 
enforces a more neutral tax policy and administration on foreign-earned income.  It removes the 
current incentives for the $2.5 trillion of income to remain abroad and removes the need for the 
foreign tax credit, one of the most costly code provisions.  It supports more foreign and domestic 
investment and supports higher after-tax income for corporations, strengthening the competitive 
advantage of the US and a universally better flow of capital.  However, like most anything, the 
territorial approach has risks that the US must consider in its decision-making.  Transfer pricing 
and thin capitalization enable corporations to shift profits from the higher US tax rate to lower 
foreign tax rates, exposing the potential erosion of the US corporate taxable base.  The US 
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should also consider other countries who presently have a territorial system, especially those 
countries who transitioned from a worldwide approach.  Japan’s switch in 2009 offers a 
comparable match to the situation of the US since Japan’s prior worldwide system closely 
resembles the current one in the US.  Japan’s unique circumstances may have persuaded the 
results, but Japan’s territorial system exemplifies the positive changes it has had on Japan’s 
unemployment and corporate tax revenue.  As Japan and the majority of OECD and all other G7 
countries show, taxing foreign earnings on a territorial basis is the norm.  Even though the US 
does not have to mimic this norm, the US should question the reasons for its popularity and its 
applicableness to the US.  More importantly, the US should note the ability to mold the territorial 
approach to the most suitable design for the US.  Adopting a territorial system, along with other 
modifications such as decreasing the corporate tax rate, incorporating a patent box, limiting the 
definition of deductible interest expense, broadening the definition of taxable passive income, 
and implementing a 95 percent dividend exemption system, would equip the US with policies to 
continuously monitor for problems and improvements.  In conclusion, the US must remain 
future-oriented.  Its tax regime should reflect a sufficient, convenient, efficient, and fair tax that 
maintains sustainable growth and competition.  Because a territorial approach better aligns with 
these values, the US should adopt a territorial tax system.    
 
